The MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change is an organization for research, independent policy analysis, and public education in global environmental change. It seeks to provide leadership in understanding scientific, economic, and ecological aspects of this difficult issue, and combining them into policy assessments that serve the needs of ongoing national and international discussions. To this end, the Program brings together an interdisciplinary group from two established research centers at MIT: the Center for Global Change Science (CGCS) and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR). These two centers bridge many key areas of the needed intellectual work, and additional essential areas are covered by other MIT departments, by collaboration with the Ecosystems Center of the Marine Biology Laboratory (MBL) at Woods Hole, and by short-and long-term visitors to the Program. The Program involves sponsorship and active participation by industry, government, and non-profit organizations.
INTRODUCTION
China is a major economy, energy user and emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Its share of the global economy and energy use has increased substantially in the past 30 years and is likely to continue to grow. In this paper, we explore short-and long-term implications of several scenarios of energy and climate policy in China. We focus on the impacts on global energy markets, GDP growth and welfare in China, and on global climate indicators such as atmospheric GHG concentrations, radiative forcing, and global temperature change. To investigate these alternative pictures of economic development and energy use, we employ the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model, a computable general equilibrium model of the world economy. Many analysts and policymakers have emphasized the importance of China to climate stabilization. Indeed, the refusal by the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was strongly influenced by a concern that developing countries like China and India were not taking similar commitments (Bush, 2001) . The main contribution of this paper is a quantification of the impacts of China's participation in global climate policy based on a modeling system that considers linkages among all economic sectors and all regions of the world. We consider both the impacts of the short-term commitments that China proposed during the UN climate meetings in Copenhagen and Cancun (Copenhagen Accord, 2010) , and longer-term implications of an accelerated deployment in China of natural gas, nuclear energy, bioenergy, renewable electricity, electric cars, and improvements in energy and fuel efficiencies.
The paper is organized in the following manner. In Section 2 we briefly describe historic trends in China's energy use and emissions in the last 30 years. Section 3 focuses on short-term plans (for the next decade) regarding China's emissions. In Section 4 we consider potential longterm trajectories for China's emissions, and the resulting contributions to control of global climate risk. Section 5 elucidates our conclusions.
HISTORIC TRENDS IN CHINA'S ENERGY USE AND EMISSIONS
In a relatively short period of time China has become a major economic force. As China moved to greater openness and economic restructuring, its eagerness to engage in numerous fastdeveloped projects and its relatively cheap labor force have attracted many manufacturing enterprises. Companies and entrepreneurs of different incomes and sizes have moved to China to capitalize on its comparative advantage, make products more cheaply, and export them to other regions of the globe. -Made in China‖ has been transformed from a rarity in developed markets in the 1980s to the dominant label in the 1990s and 2000s. The resulting increase in the earnings of exporters-and in the income of workers, domestic entrepreneurs and government entitieshas allowed China to move forward on substantial domestic infrastructure projects. Energy and cement needs have increased even further in the 2000s, making China the world's largest energy consumer (IEA, 2011; BP, 2011 ) and greenhouse gas (GHG) source in 2010 (Reuters, 2010) .
At the same time, the 1990s and 2000s have seen an increased awareness of the impact of anthropogenic emissions of GHGs. Fossil fuel emissions are a major component of anthropogenic emissions (IPCC, 2007) . Coal is relatively more carbon-intensive compared to oil and natural gas 1 . As China relies on coal for its energy needs, consuming about 50 percent of the total world coal (BP, 2011) , it has become clear that any meaningful climate stabilization will not be possible without China. The country would need to transform its energy system from being coal-and oil-based to relying, instead, on lower carbon-emitting technologies.
Looking at total energy use in China (Figure 1) , from 1980 to 1990, the increase was about 60%; from 1990 to 2000 it was around 50%, and from 2000 to 2010 energy use grew by 130%.
Most of the increase in the 2000s was associated with a decision to begin to reorient the economy from exports toward domestic consumption, a shift that required large infrastructure projects and substantial energy inputs. As previously mentioned, coal is the primary energy source in China with a share of about 70%, with oil consumption representing another 20%. As the population of China gets wealthier, the number of automobiles and oil consumption are increasing. Recently, use of natural gas and hydropower has also increased, but this still comprises a small share of China's energy needs. Because of the relatively higher carbon content of coal relative to other fossil fuels, the proportion of coal in total energy CO 2 emissions is even larger than its share of energy use.
According to Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) data, (Figure 2 ), in 2008 coal contributed more than 80% to the total energy-related CO 2 emissions in China. The figure also shows CO 2 emissions from cement production. These grew at an even higher rate than energy-related emissions-the proportion of cement in total CO 2 was about 3-4% in the 1980s and 1990s, and then grew to about 9-10% in the 2000s. Figure 2 also shows a small decrease in emissions from coal at the end of the 1990s, while coal use was roughly constant during that time. As GDP grew at a faster rate than energy use, energy intensity (i.e., energy use per unit of GDP) has been falling (a trend that is depicted for China in Figure 4 ). Paltsev and Reilly (2009) Future paths of energy and carbon intensities depend on the introduction of lower carbonemitting (or even carbon-free) technologies, further increases in efficiency due to rising energy prices (and potentially the imposition of carbon prices), and potential structural changes in the economy that move from heavy manufacturing toward the services sector. In the next section, we describe plans by China that address these possibilities.
SHORT-TERM PLANS
China recognizes the challenges in energy system transformation, putting energy targets into its five-year plans. For example, in its 11 th Five-Year Plan the goal of a 20% reduction in energy intensity for 2006-2010 was combined with a target of a 10% share of non-fossil fuels (hydro, nuclear, solar, wind, biomass, etc.) in primary energy consumption. The second target is hard to assess with publicly available data because China puts traditional biomass use into the target, and this number is difficult to get from independent sources.
The reduction in energy intensity is easier to verify, but there is some discrepancy between the data released by China's National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 2 and the data for energy from BP (2011) Plan year of 0.5%. As a result, according to NDRC about a 19% reduction was achieved, while alternative estimates from well-established sources reveal approximately a 15% reduction.
Considering the increasing trend in the early 2000s, even a 15% reduction in energy intensity is a remarkable achievement.
In its current 12 th Five-Year Plan (2011 -2015 , China has declared even more ambitious goals 3 . It plans for 11.4% share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption by 2015, rising to 15% by 2020. (See Table 1 The plan also calls for capacity targets for non-fossil electricity by 2015: 40 GW of nuclear, an additional 70 GW of wind, an additional 5 GW of solar, and an additional 120 GW of hydro (although a target for hydro does not specify the exact date). Considering that current (2010) nuclear electricity generation capacity is about 10 GW, wind generation capacity is 45 GW, solar generation capacity is 0.9 GW, and hydro is 120 GW, the targets for 2015 are very ambitious. At the same time, the total electrical capacity in 2008 was about 800 GW 4 . Therefore, even if all these additions materialize, fossil fuels (primarily coal) will remain by far the major source of electricity. 8 There also are plans for pilot cap-and-trade systems and feed-in tariffs for wind and biomass for some provinces. In the transportation sector, rebates for electric cars and small cars are envisioned. Natural gas production (and use) has also received special attention. In the 11 th FiveYear Plan there was a goal for natural gas to have a 10% share of energy use by 2020, whichdepending on the total energy use-could be translated to about 10-13 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas consumption. The 12 th Five-Year Plan calls for an increase in natural gas use from the current (year 2010) consumption of about 4 Tcf to more than 9 Tcf by 2015. Assuming annual GDP growth of 7-8%, to satisfy an 18% energy intensity reduction requirement in 2015, the total energy use in China should be 117-123 EJ. To meet the Copenhagen carbon intensity target of 40% reduction, the total 2020 CO 2 emissions in China should be 11.6-12.7 Gt CO 2 ; for a 45% reduction total emissions should be around 10.6-11.7 Gt CO 2 . We will return to these targets in the next section (Section 4) where we discuss the simulation results.
In terms of the immediate climate implications of China's short-term goals, we find that-in 2020-actions by China would reduce atmospheric concentrations by less than 10 ppm CO 2 -eq, which translates to a difference in global temperature of about 0.1 degree C in 2020 6 . This result is consistent with previous work (e.g., Prinn et al., 2011) that shows that inertia in the climate system leads to very small differences in climate results in the next 10 to 20 years, regardless of mitigation effort. For a meaningful climate policy there is a need for a sustained reduction in emissions for an extended period of time. We discuss such trajectories in the following section.
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POTENTIAL LONG-TERM TRAJECTORIES
To consider long-term implications of different emissions trajectories, we apply scenarios developed by the Asian Modeling Exercise (Calvin et al., 2012) as follows:
 Scenario 1a = -Reference‖, where we assume no climate policy and do not explicitly impose the energy and emissions targets discussed in Section 3;
 Scenario 2a = -CO 2 Price $10 (5% p.a.)‖, where all regions of the world impose a $10/tCO 2 price starting in 2020 which grows at 5% per year;
 Scenario 2b = -CO 2 Price $30 (5% p.a.)‖, which is similar to Scenario 2a but starts at $30/tCO 2 in 2020;
 Scenario 2c = -CO 2 Price $50 (5% p.a.)‖, which is similar to Scenario 2a, but starts at $50/tCO 2 in 2020; and  Scenario 3a = -3.7 W/m 2 NTE‖, where a carbon price is imposed to reach the specified radiative forcing stabilization by 2100.
For climate simulations, we use the MIT Integrated Global System Model (IGSM),which couples sub-models of human activity and emissions, the Emissions Prediction and Policy
Analysis (EPPA) model, atmospheric dynamics, physics and chemistry (including separate treatment of urban regions), oceanic heat uptake, sea ice and carbon cycling, and land system processes described by the coupled Terrestrial Ecosystem Model (TEM), Natural Emissions Model (NEM), and Community Land Model (CLM), as described in detail in Sokolov et al. (2005) . Calvin et al. (2012) provide an overview of the results for the different scenarios of the Asia Modeling Exercise described above, so we focus herein only on the major findings. Scenario 3a
is the most stringent of the four core policy scenarios (it requires carbon prices three times higher than Scenario 2c), so we provide more detailed results for Reference and Scenario 3a. In all climate policy scenarios, carbon revenues are recycled to representative consumers in a lumpsum fashion. Projections for energy use in China in the Reference scenario are presented in To reach the Copenhagen commitment of 40% reduction in carbon intensity by 2020, total CO 2 emissions should be in the range of 11.9 Gt CO 2 (10.9 Gt for a 45% reduction). In the Reference scenario, 2020 CO 2 emissions are about 1 Gt higher than that range. Also in the Reference scenario targets for electricity are roughly equal to the planned capacity increases. The channels for additional energy and emissions reduction are improvements in transportation fuel efficiency and residential and industrial energy efficiency; yet, the impact of this CO 2 intensity commitment is less than a 1% reduction in GDP in 2020 in comparison to the no-policy Reference scenario. 
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The drastic transformation would require substantial investments in new energy infrastructure. Also-in the simulation-the economic system is responding to increased energy prices that are driven by carbon charges. The cost of this transformation can be significant, with a reduction of GDP in 2050 at about 10-20% below the Reference projection. This estimate reflects mitigation costs only and does not consider climate benefits and potential ancillary nonclimate benefits of GHG mitigation (e.g., through reduced urban air pollution). Matus et al. (2012) estimated that welfare impacts of air pollution in China can be in the range of 5-10% of total macroeconomic consumption.
We now turn to the climate implications of these alternative scenarios. To project climate results we extend the simulation horizon even further, to 2100. The emissions and climate implications of alternative scenarios are presented in Figure 7 . Figure 7a shows that, in the absence of any climate policy, GHG emissions are projected to grow from the current 45 Gt CO 2 -eq to about 100 Gt CO 2 -eq by the end of the century. In the control scenarios considered here, carbon prices are rising over time, so the reductions are also increasing over time. Figure 7b shows the resulting GHG concentrations in CO 2 equivalent terms considering all Kyoto gases. In the Reference scenario, concentrations reach above 1,300 ppm and continue to grow, while Scenario 3a results in stabilization at around 550 ppm. Scenarios 2a, 2b, and 2c result in 950, 750, and 650 ppm concentrations by 2100, respectively. Figure 7c shows the resulting increase in global average surface temperature relative to 2000.
In the Reference scenario, temperature increases by about 5.5°C, while stabilization scenarios 2a, 2b, 2c and 3a limit the increase to 3.5°, 2.4°, 2.0°, and 1.2°C respectively. As the increase in temperature from the pre-industrial level to the year 2000 was about 0.8°C, Scenario 3a puts the world on track to the often-stated target of limiting the global temperature increase to 2°C. On the other hand, if China decides to re-structure its energy system for energy security, export potential of carbon-free technologies, or air pollution reasons, the risks of negative climate impact are reduced substantially. Webster et al. (2012) show that even limited actions 16 towards reducing GHG concentrations result in a substantial reduction in risk of exceeding a certain temperature threshold. For example, stabilization at 800 ppm reduces the probability of exceeding 4°C in 2100 to 7% from 85% in the no-policy scenario. Therefore, even some action directed at GHG reductions by a subset of regions will appreciably reduce the probability of more extreme levels of temperature increase.
As previously mentioned, GDP and welfare impacts of stabilization policies are significant.
Even in the carbon pricing scenarios considered here, GDP losses in China could be in the range of 10-20% in 2020-2050, and up to 40% by the end of the century in the most stringent scenario in comparison to a non-policy scenario. The suggested GDP losses are driven by higher energy prices leading to a relative reduction of domestic consumption, a decrease in exports and an increase in imports. When policy instruments deviate from an idealized economy-wide GHG tax or pricing, the costs of meeting a target increases further. (For a discussion of impacts when GHG pricing or a cap-and-trade system is replaced with renewable energy requirements, see, for example, Morris et al., 2010) . It should be noted that estimates of GDP losses depend on many assumptions, such as the costs of advanced technologies; potential for a re-location of heavyindustry and manufacturing to relatively lower-cost regions; availability of energy resources, and other factors. For example, we do not consider here the scenarios with relatively cheap and substantial natural gas reserves in China. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2011) reports large shale gas resources in China, but their volumetric estimates are highly uncertain and cost estimates are not yet available. Relying on inexpensive natural gas as opposed to coal (that faces larger carbon penalties) would reduce energy costs and lead to higher domestic consumption and lower production costs; this in turn would affect net exports from China.
Another aspect not considered here is related to China's potential leadership in development of advanced energy technologies and their exports to other countries that would positively affect GDP calculations and reduce losses.
Absent near universal participation of major GHG emitters, stringent climate stabilization goals are very costly (or not achievable) because economic activity and emissions would shift to nations that are not signatories to the agreement. Even with all nations taking on commitments, the policies would require a complex system of financial transfers to simultaneously satisfy widely-discussed burden-sharing goals. Ultimately, differences in the costs of abatement between countries will depend on their energy, industrial and agricultural systems (which determine marginal costs of abatement in the sectors), emissions allocations, policy instruments, and financial transfers.
One way to engage China and other developing countries in mitigation actions and spur investment in low-carbon technologies might be by sectoral trading, which involves including a sector from one or more nations in an international cap-and-trade system. Gavard et al. (2011) explored the issue and found that a sectoral policy induces significant financial transfers between countries, but for China it might lead to only small increases in electricity generation from nuclear and renewables.
Another way to facilitate the involvement of developing countries would be through Successful climate negotiations will need to be grounded in a full understanding of the substantial amounts at stake. As shown, China's involvement in substantial GHG emissions reduction is a key to a successful climate policy. Recent attention by China to its energy and emissions problems offers an encouraging sign that a successful climate policy still can be a reality.
CONCLUSION
China is a major economy, energy-user and emitter of GHGs. Its share of the global economy and energy use has increased substantially in the past 30 years and is likely to continue to grow.
Our analysis of the short-term commitments that China proposed during the UN climate meetings in Copenhagen and Cancun show that they might be reached at a very modest cost. In terms of climate results, in the next 20 years China's alternative actions do not contribute to any substantial changes due to inertia in the climate system. To consider the long-term climate implications of the Copenhagen-type of commitments (which establish the pledges for the next 10 years only), one has to assume the policies after 2020; the effects differ drastically based on the assumptions about actions in the post-2020 period. Meeting a 2°C target is problematic unless radical GHG emissions reductions are assumed in the short-term.
In terms of climate results over the next 10-20 years, China's intended actions over the next decade do not contribute to any substantial changes due to inertia in the climate system. In terms of the long-term impacts on climate, the participation or non-participation of China in global climate architecture can lead by 2100 to a 200-280 ppm difference in the total GHG concentrations, which results in a 1.1-1.3°C of temperature change by the end of the century. A meaningful participation by China in long-term climate stabilization will require more ambitious plans and targets than China is currently envisaging. We conclude that it is essential to engage China in GHG emissions mitigation policies, and alternative actions lead to substantial differences in climate, energy, and economic outcomes. Potential channels for engaging China can be air pollution considerations and involvement in sectoral trading with established emissions trading systems in developed countries.
